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Résumé / Abstract
Nous détectons les avantages comparatifs au Canada et en Europe à
partir des éléments fondamentaux d’une économie : les dotations, les technologies
et les préférences. Par la programmation linéaire, en utilisant les tableaux
entrée-sortie et un algorithme servant à imposer l’équilibre de la balance
commerciale, nous déterminons l’allocation optimale des ressources, qui soustend
les échanges optimaux. Le Canada a un avantage comparatif par rapport à l’Europe
dans les minéraux, la machinerie, les vêtements et les chaussures. Les gains à
l’échange sont minimes pour la grande économie, l’Europe, mais substantiels pour
le petit pays, le Canada. La structure des avantages comparatifs persiste quand nous
permettons le libre choix entre les technologies et les préférences des deux pays. Les
dotations ressortent donc comme étant le facteur déterminant de la structure des
avantages comparatifs.
We locate the comparative advantages of Canada and Europe on the
basis of their fundamentals only: endowments, technologies, and preferences. A
linear program with an input-output core and an algorith for the balance of
payments constraint will determine the efficient allocation of resources. The
supporting allocations determine the optimum pattern of trade. The Canadian
advantage compared to Europe is in minerals, machines and clothing &
footwear. Gains to free bilateral trade are estimated to be negligible for the big
economy, Europe, but significant for the small one, Canada. The pattern of
comparative advantage persists when we allowfor free access to technology and
consumption coefficients and, therefore, can be ascribed to the endowments.
Mots Clés : Avantages comparatifs, gains au libre-échange
Keywords : Comparative advantage, Gains to free trade
JEL : F10
11. Introduction
One of the basic issues in trade theory is the determination of the sources of
comparative advantage and hence of trade between countries. The early theories
stressed one aspect at a time (such as differences in technology in the Ricardian
model and differences in endowments in the Heckscher-Ohlin model). They
neutralized the other possible sources of relative domestic price differences in order
to prove their argument in the most simple possible way. That is what theory should
do. Then, a number of studies has tried to test the various theories (see the survey
by Leamer and Levinsohn, 1994). The problem with these tests is that they are
counterfactual. For instance, to test the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model, Bowen,
Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987) assume common technologies and common
preferences and then confront actual trade data with those produced by the model.
That the model is rejected should come as no surprise. 
However, by using independent data on trade, endowments, and technologies,
Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987) and Trefler (1993) make a fundamental
improvement over previous studies. The data are country speci- fic as regards trade
and endowments, but not for technologies. The rejection of their model calls for
variation of technology across countries and they do so by allowing for neutral
departures from the U.S. technology. But when doing so, the existing theory has to
be modified in order to conform to the new, more realistic, environment in which
the test is con- ducted. 
We go a step further by setting up a model of a competitive economy which allows
for country-specific endowments, preferences and technologies, the fundamentals
of the economy according to neoclassical theory. The gain is two-fold. First and
foremost, we need no reference country for technology as in Bowen, Leamer and
Sveikauskas (1987) and Trefler (1993). Second, we compute the competitive
benchmark head-on, including the optimal trade figures between Europe and
Canada in 1980, keeping trade with the rest of the world fixed. The choice of
economies is opportunistic. Since the model is truly general equilibrium, that is
based on fundamentals only and with all prices endogenous, the incorporation of the
rest of the world as a third economy (or family of economies) is a straightforward
extension. The obvious candidate for inclusion is the United States.
Our benchmark is the competitive trade model, based on differences in all the
fundamentals. We derive the competitive benchmark for the location of comparative
advantage in the two countries and for the gains to free trade from the fundamentals
directly. Numerous distortions, such as monopoly power, externalities, tariffs and
other impediments, drive a wedge between the hypothetical and observed patterns
of trade. However, rather than trying to get a handle on these departures from the
competitive benchmark, we give up the information contained in the trade statistics
altogether and return to the full set of fundamental data. From a theoretical point of
2view, our contribution is modest as it merely implements ideas that have been
around quite some time. A reference is the theoretical introduction of Ginsburgh and
Waelbroeck (1981, pp. 30-31) where they consider the maximization of
consumption subject to commodity and factor input constraints. In the empirical
part, however, Ginsburgh and Waelbroeck (1981, p. 176) note that such a model
could not be handled with available means. We carry out the program suggested by
Ginsburgh and Waelbroeck. No statistics or constructs beyond the fundamentals of
the economies are used. In particular, we employ no price statistics. Nor do we
admit artificial limitations on the direction of trade. The model provides a true
general equilibrium determination of the commodity pattern of trade. A linear
program with an input-output core and an algorithm for the balance of payments
will determine the efficient allocation of activity. It is known that this approach
yields a high degree of specialization. This is merely a reflection of the
dimensionality of the issue. A key test for the factor-endowments approach is
whether it can accommodate reality in a context simple enough (i.e. of low enough
dimensionality) to be theoretically tractable. Indeed, a distinctive feature of our
attempt is to determine the disaggregated pattern of comparative advantage on the
basis of only a few fundamentals, namely the primitives suggested by neoclassical
theory. Consequently we face many more goods than factors and specialization is
natural. Unlike Krueger (1984, p. 545) suggests, this property does not depend on
the input-output assumption of fixed coefficients. As a matter of fact, input
substitutability would widen the scope for specialization. To avoid the latter, one
must resort to brute force. In linear programming, artificial constraints are used (e.g.
trade and activity restrictions as in Williams, 1978). In a neoclassical study, Diewert
and Morrison (1986) assume a form of jointness of output which is conditioned by
the pattern of trade and preserves it. Chipman and Tian (1992) also bar trade
reversals. 
As is well known, estimates of inefficiencies of trade restrictions are modest when
the patterns of trade and underlying activity are taken for granted. Within a
framework of goods that agrees with the observed outputs, exports, and imports, the
welfare losses are given by the Harberger triangles. The size of a triangle is half the
base times the height and the two are related to each other by the elasticity of
demand. In short, the welfare losses are quadratic in either the price or the quantity
distortion, hence small. Romer (1994) shows that gains to free trade are of a higher
order if the list of goods that defines the framework of an economy is endogenous,
namely the outcome of profit maximization involving fixed costs. Free trade would
lengthen the list and create new areas of consumer surplus. We will show that one
does not have to go as far as Romer, questioning the observed categories of goods,
to suggest high welfare stakes of free trade. It suffices to endogenize the direction
of trade in order to show the existence of efficiency gains of a higher order than the
ones implied by Harberger calculations. 
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The solution to our linear program measures the maximum possible welfare gain
and identifies the comparative advantages. All market imperfections and departures
from the simple perfectly competitive model are ignored when the benchmark is
calculated. To the extent that the very concept of comparative advantage is
grounded in the fundamentals of the economy—endowments, technology, and
preferences—imperfections outside these data must be excluded indeed. An
example is monopoly power. It is a behavioral distortion, independent of the
fundamentals. It has an impact on the trade position of an economy, but should not
codetermine its comparative advantage. The latter, by definition, results from the
preferred allocation of activity subject to the fundamentals only. 
Some departures from the competitive benchmark cannot be separated from the
fundamentals, but are grounded in the physical structure of the economies,
particularly product differentiation and scale economies. Harris (1984) builds a real
trade general equilibrium model to assess trade liberalization effects. This purpose,
as well as the requirement that some historical data set is produced as an
equilibrium, infringe on the "pureness" of the model. The theoretical requirement
that supply and demand are derived from the fundamentals of the economy is
sacrificed by installing CES-"muffles" (make "Armington") at four interfaces of
supply and demand (Harris, 1984, pp. 1020, 1022 and 1026). "Muffles" limit
substitutability between commodities which differ by origin. These components are
combined in a nonadditive formula which is minimized to determine their shares.
For example, to determine exports (E for domestic and E* for all other countries
exports) CES-muffle 
is supposed to be "produced" at minimum cost. Exports are thus "determined" as a
smooth function of domestic and foreign prices. A Cobb- Douglas version of the
muffle divides intermediate demand between domestic supply and imports. One
might think of goods and services supplied by different countries or industries as
being differentiated not only in transportation costs, but also in terms of intrinsic
product characteristics. When the purpose of study is the location of comparative
advantage, however, the procedure is unnecessary and unwanted. From an
econometric perspective, the evidence is no longer indirect (estimates of muffle
parameters $ and 8), but direct (observations of endowments, technology, and
preferences). A second, related difference is that we are not plagued by the need to
manipulate price formation. Harris averages Chamberlainan prices with the more
oligopolistic ones of Eastman-Stijkolt. Deardorff (1986) shows that this element
introduces a theoretical inconsistency, but is necessary to get effects of tariff
 The location of comparative advantages in a system of more than two economies would involve a1
vector scanner, (, and a fixed point algorithm to find the value such that the consequent vector of
national surpluses for all but one economies is mapped into the observed surpluses. (Walras’ law would
take care of the remaining economy.)
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reductions. 
In our opinion, product differentiation is an aggregation phenomenon. If products
are differentiated, they constitute different commodities and the efficient pattern of
trade must be determined at the most disaggregated level. Upon aggregation back
to the level of differentiated products, intra-industry trade emerges. Cross-hauling
actually represents different commodity components at the more detailed level of
classification. Scale economies are a more intrinsic phenomenon. Since the related
monopoly power is a priori excluded from our model as noted above, only the
scale-induced changes in technical coefficients could be relevant for the detection
of comparative advantages. This effect is ignored in this study. Inclusion would
reinforce the gains to free trade. It is interesting to note that we can explain
significant gains to free trade without using scale economies. In principle, scale
economies might change the locational pattern of comparative advantages, but we
do not expect them to be that high. 
2. Locating comparative advantages
Woodland (1982) develops a neoclassical model of international trade with fixed
domestic endowments and with tradeable and nontradeable commodities, used for
intermediate or final consumption. We make it operational by substituting Leontief
functions for the technologies and preferences and, sticking to the observed
proportions of final consumption and investment in the national economies. The
efficient allocation of resources is obtained by maximizing the level of final
consumption (including investment) in one economy, subject to a level of final
consumption in the other economy. The latter, predetermined level must be such
that the outcomes preserve the actual bilateral balance of payments. We will find
this balanced, efficient allocation by scanning the final consumption frontier for the
two economies. Thus, let c denote the level of final consumption in Europe and c
the same for Canada. Italic symbols represent Canadian items. We scan the
(c,c)-frontier with the Canadian-European final consumption ratio, (, by putting
c = c(. For every ratio (, a linear program will determine the maximum level of
final consumption, c, subject to material balance and endowment constraints . Apart1
from c itself, the variables are the vectors of gross outputs, x for Europe and x for
Canada. The linear program is
max
x,x,c$0 e
yyc % e yy(c subject to
 Tradable commodities are those for which Statistics Canada (1983) reports data of foreign trade.2
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(1)
for tradeable commodities:
(I - A)x + (I - A)x $ (y + y()c + z + z (2)
for nontradeable commodities:
(I - A)x $ yc , (I -A)x $ y(c (3)
and for factor inputs:
kx # K , lx # L , kx # K , lx # L (4)
The expression "for (non)tradeable commodities" restricts the announced vector
inequality to the respective components . In the objective function, e  = (1 ... 1).2 y
The program features the following European parameters:
y = final consumption vector (including investment, excluding trade)
z = net exports vector (except for bilateral trade)
A = commodity input coefficients matrix
k = capital input coefficients row vector
l = labor input coefficients row vector
K = capital stock
L = labor force (5)
The Canadian parameters are in italic script. For normalization of the supporting
price system, we have included a positive constant in the objective function.
Variable c acts as an expansion factor. The solution is not affected by the monotonic
transformation of the objective function. For every value of the final consumption
frontier scanner, ( =c/c, denote the optimum (European) consumption level by c(()
and the outputs in the two countries by x(() and x((), respectively. For low values
of (, Canadian consumption is unimportant and the bulk of net output is exported
to Europe. Similarly, the trade balance shows a European surplus for high values
of (. European net exports to Canada are given by the vector,
for tradeable commodities: (I - A)x(() - yc(() - z (6)
S 0 ' e y(x 0 & Ax 0 & y & z)
(n%1 '
[S((n) & S 0](n&1 & [S((n&1) & S 0](n
S((n) & S((n&1)
6
(8)
(9)
In a general equilibrium framework like the above, the supporting competive prices
are given by the shadow prices of the linear program. Denote them,
for tradeable commodities:   p(() (7)
By the dual constraint associated with the c-coefficients in (2-3), the value of final
consumption, y + y(, under the shadow prices is equal to its nominal value, the
coefficient in (1). In other words, the coefficient in the objective function has been
selected such that only relative prices change. By the dual constraint associated with
the x-coefficients in (2- 4), European profits are nonpositive. Similarly, by the dual
constraint associated with the x-coefficients in (2-4), Canadian profits are
nonpositive. Sectors with negative profits are inactive by the phenomenon of
complementary slackness. 
European surplus on the bilateral trade account is equal to the (inner) product of
expressions (7) and (6) and will be denoted by S((). For ( low, S(() is negative,
and for ( high, S(() is positive. For some intermediate value, S(() will match the
observed surplus on the bilateral trade account,
where x  is the observed value of gross output vector x. We find the intermediate0
value of ( by the Newton-Raphson algorithm,
with initial values (  = 0 and (  = 1.0 1
The limit of process (9) solves S(() = S  and is, therefore, the general equilibrium0
value of the Canadian-European final consumption expansion ratio, ( = c/c. For this
value, the linear program determines the levels, c(() and c((), the allocations, x(()
and x(() and the bilateral trade vector, (6). The sign pattern of bilateral trade locates
the comparative advantages of the two economies. Notice that this is accomplished
solely on the basis of parameters (5) for Europe and similar parameters for Canada.
The parameters represent taste (y), technology (A, k and l) and endowments (K and
L), and fix the rest of the world (z). In other words, we have located the comparative
advantages on the basis of the fundamentals of the economies, without recourse to
prices. All prices are endogenous. Prices of the tradeable commodities (7) are
shadow prices associated with constraint (2). The prices of the nontradeable
 In fact, algorithm (9) stopped after only six iterations and the difference between the computed and3
actual deficits was only 24 ECU, an incredibly small fraction of the deficit.
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commodities, associated with constraints (3), and those of the factor inputs,
associated with constraints (4), are specific to the individual economies.
By letting consumption and input proportions represent taste and technology, we
made a short-cut. Strictly speaking, technology is a blue- book of techniques and the
choice of techniques depends on the relative prices. The observed input-output
coefficients reflect the techniques prevailing under the observed prices. Now if the
prices change to the general equilibrium values, the choice of technique and hence
the input- output coefficients may be different. Induced change of techniques within
the technology blue-book thus prompts further reallocations of endowments and
gains to specialization. The same holds for consumption: taste is a blue-book of
consumption coefficients and the latter may adjust. By restricting the blue-book of
technology and consumption to a single page for each economy, our model ignores
the further reallocations and, therefore, the results will be conservative. Since the
point of this paper is to demonstrate how endogenous patterns of productive activity
create significant gains to free trade, it suffices to do so in the context of the narrow
Leontief framework that underlies the above model. 
3. Canadian advantages compared to Europe
If bilateral trade were completely free and the national economies were perfectly
competitive, the free trade pattern of table 1 would emerge, if we ignore the
ramifications on the trade with the rest of the world. (The data and the superfree
trade pattern are discussed in the appendix and in the course of this section. Ideally,
the rest of the world is to be included as the third economy. The methodology
remains perfectly applicable.) The first two columns of the table contrast the actual
and the optimum trade figures (Statistics Canada, 1983 and equation 6). By
construction, the observed European trade deficit with Canada is the same . The3
second column reveals that the Canadian comparative advantage vis-à-vis Europe
given the trade with the rest of the world rests in minerals, machines, and clothing
& footwear.
The resulting comparative advantage contrasts with observed trade (first column of
table 1). In reality Canada exports chiefly minerals, metal products, consumption
goods, and other manufactures, and imports machines, transportation equipment,
and clothing & footwear. The endogenous comparative advantages may also conflict
with intuition. For example, agricultural exports are not taken up by Canada, but by
Europe. Such a discrepancy can be due to: (1) departures from free trade such as
government support of farmers; (2) model limitations; (3) preconceptions. Certainly
not the first explanation drives the wedge, since this distortion is less in Canada than
8in Europe. The departure from free trade would not push the comparative advantage
between actual agricultural trade and our model solution to the intuitive candidate,
Canada. The second explanation may have some validity, since land is not modeled
as a separate factor and the rest of the world is not included. The third explanation
also has some sway. In fact, Canada has only a slight edge in agricultural value
added per worker (10,110 versus 8,884 ECU per worker), whereas agricultural
value added per unit of capital is the same in the two economies. Because of the
scarcity of Canadian capital, it does not pay to exploit the mild Canadian
technological edge in this sector.
Bilateral trade liberalization would multiply the volume of trade and let the small
economy (Canada) specialize in only a few sectors. Note, however, that these
sectors continue to feature two-way trade under perfectly competitive conditions.
This is due to product differentiation. For example, in minerals the (dominant)
Canadian export is in mining, but it is countered by European exports in petroleum
& natural gas and non-metallic minerals. Similarly, Canadian exports of machines
are countered by European electrical goods. And in clothing and footwear, Canada
picks up the footwear.
The revelation of product differentiation in the phenomenon of two-way trade is
limited by the level of disaggregation. In our model, where we want to determine
comparative advantages on the basis of the fundamentals of the economies, we
choose the most disaggregated classification of products that we could reconcile
with the Eurostat and Statistics Canada production units. In this approach, footwear
is footwear, be it European or Canadian. Seminar participants have suggested that
Italian footwear is different from Canadian and that, therefore, trade should be
two-way even at the disaggregated level. We admit that this is true in principle.
However, in our opinion the only correct way of modeling this is to disaggregate the
data. Our view deviates from the dominant one in the literature where product
differentiation is imposed by taking into account the origin of commodities (the so
called Armington assumption, Harris, 1984, and Srinivasan and Whalley, 1986).
Such an imposition of two-way trade may be a practical (albeit brute force) device
to obtain a good fit, but it is useless for the location of comparative advantages,
particularly when they are not assumed to be revealed by the international trade
statistics.
Let us give some idea of the relative importance of the determinants of comparative
advantage. As is common in the literature, we will focus on the role of endowments
by holding technology and taste constant across the economies. This is implemented
in neoclassical fashion by assuming free access to each other's technology and,
similarly, by introducing substitutability between the mean consumption vectors in
either economy. The modification yields a model of free trade between economies
with free access to technology in production and consumption. This so called
superfree model is presented in the appendix and the consequent pattern of
9superfree trade is reported in the last column of table 1. The Canadian comparative
advantages in machines and clothing & footwear persist when technology
differences in production and consumption are eliminated, but the minerals
production is picked up by Europe. The initial conclusion is, therefore, that the
Canadian comparative advantage is determined by endowments (for machines and
clothing & footwear) and technology (for minerals). A qualification of the
technology determinant seems in order. It turns out that Europe adopts the Canadian
technology to produce minerals. The Canadian input coefficients are relatively small
in this sector. Note, however, that our model does not account for natural resources
separately. The Canadian abundance or quality of the ores is reflected in the level
of the input coefficients. The superfree scenario, by moving this technology to
Europe, sort of endows Europe with the Canadian edge in minerals. This peculiar
role of input coefficients in minerals is known. Carter (1970) showed that it is the
only sector where input-output developments indicate technical regress and that the
underlying problem is not a deterioration of knowledge, but of the quality of the
unaccounted resource. In so far the Canadian edge in mineral production is a
reflection of the abundance of natural resources, the transfer of Canadian technology
to Europe would not be supportable by a more detailed model. We therefore
speculate that a fuller model, accounting for natural resources as a third endowment
in addition to capital and labor, would ascribe the Canadian comparative advantage
in minerals to the natural resource endowment, rather than technology. In short, the
Canadian comparative advantage is determined by endowments.
Now let us shift attention from the product nature of trade to the factor contents. Are
differences in European and Canadian factor endowment proportions leveled out by
trade? We have calculated the factor contents embodied in the net trade vectors
(actual, free, and superfree), see table 2. The technique is due to Leontief (1953),
but now the pattern of the comparative advantage revealing trade is endogenous.
The first line of table 2 shows the capital/labor endowments ratios of the two
economies. (These figures are obtained by simple divisions of the data at the bottom
of tables 4 and 5.) Europe is endowed with relatively much capital. The second and
third lines of table 2 show agreement between the effects of observed and free trade.
We focus on after trade ratios rather than exports and imports factor intensities to
make the analysis Leamer (1980) proof. The capital-labor ratio in the big economy,
Europe, is not affected. The capital-labor ratio of Canada deteriorates further.
Obviously, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem does not work here. There are numerous
reasons for this, as pointed out by Batra and Casas (1973), Deardorff (1984), and
Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987). Perhaps the most important one is that the
theorem assumes free access to technology and common preferences. Now these
conditions are precisely the ones of the superfree trade scenario. Hence the last line
of table 2 is a more appropriate test of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. The results
show that with common access to technology and consumption patterns free trade
max
x,d$0 e
yy d subject to
(I & A)x $ yd % z
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(11)
(12)
would indeed level out factor intensity differences.
While differences in technology and consumption patterns played a minor role in
the location of comparative advantages, they are important to the movements of
factor contents. Because of such differences, factor intensities are leveled out neither
in theory nor in practice. The observed movement, however, is in agreement with
the optimal movement of factor contents between the economies with different
technologies. 
4. Gains to free trade
The solutions to (9) and (1-4) yield ( = c/c and c. The consequent
expansion factors for European and Canadian final consumption are
c = 1.075     and     c = 1.40 (10)
respectively. Perfect competition and free bilateral trade would hence boost the
European and Canadian economies by 7.5% and 40%, respectively. The difference
reflects the relative importance of bilateral trade to the two economies. Gains accrue
to both. Parts of the efficiency gains, however, are obtained by the elimination of the
domestic waste of resources from misallocation and less than full utilization of
resources. To isolate the gains to free trade, we must determine the domestic
efficiency gains that the program can achieve without departing from the observed
bilateral trade vector.
The domestic expansion factor for Europe, given the full net exports vector, z¯, is
obtained by
kx # K  ,  lx # L (13)
In italic script, this would be the domestic expansion factor program for Canada.
The consequent allocations of production and consumption are feasible with respect
to the free trade program, (1-4), with ( = d/d, for the following reason. The
domestic material balances, (12), and same but in italics for Canada, sum to (2-3)
because the bilateral net exports cancel out. The solutions to (11-13) and its
Canadian version are 
11
d = 1.073     and     d = 1.18 (14)
The bulk of the European efficiency gain can thus be ascribed to the elimination of
domestic waste of capital and labor. Comparison of results (10) and (14) shows that
Europe would gain only 0.2% to free trade with Canada. This underscores the
insignificance of the Canadian economy to Europe. For Canada, however, the
picture is different. Half of the efficiency gain of 40%, in fact 22%, can be ascribed
to free trade with Europe, as seen by subtraction of the second figures of (10) and
(14).
5. Conclusion
The location of comparative advantages of economies linked by international trade
requires independent data of the three fundamentals: resources, technologies, and
preferences. In practice, one of the ingredients is missing and the gap is filled by a
neoclassical assumption. In case of a single observation, such an assumption
amounts to fitting the observed trade to the comparative advantage, which is thus
revealed trivially. In an econometric setting, the assumption tends to be rejected. We
need no such assumption. The direction of trade is completely endogenous and
comparative advantages have been located on the basis of the fundamentals only,
by scanning the international consumption frontier. In one point, the supporting
output allocation and the accompanying price system yield the observed bilateral
balance of payments and the consequent pattern of trade locates the comparative
advantages. The observed allocation is well within the frontier. The bulk of the
difference can be ascribed to domestic inefficiencies. The remainder is the gain to
free trade. The Canadian comparative advantage vis-à-vis Europe is in minerals,
machines and clothing & footwear. The gains to free trade would be 0.2% for
Europe and 22% for Canada. The pattern of comparative advantage persists when
we allow for free access to technology and consumption coefficients and, therefore,
can be ascribed to the endowments. This free access would alter, however, the
movement of factor contents, in agreement with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. 
  Eurostat (1976, p. 162-67) uses 44 sectors in the input-output classification, and 25 sectors in the4
capital accounts. Statistics Canada (1987, 1990a) uses 50 industries and 92 commodities in the M-level
input-output classification and 29 industries in the capital accounts. In either economy, the labor
accounts follow basically the input-output classifications, slightly more aggregated. The so-called R-44
and M-level classifications have been aggregated into a common base of 26 sectors. Non-market services
in Europe, which correspond to non-business activities in Canada, are treated as exogenous in this study.
The labor and capital requirements in these sectors are subtracted from the local labor and capital
availabilities, whereas their intermediate input requirements are treated as exogenous production
requirements in each of 26 remaining sectors by inclusion in the final demand vector. The sectors are
listed 1 to 26 throughout this study. These codes and the names we have assigned to the sectors are listed
in the first column of table 3. The second column shows how they can be obtained by aggregating the
R-44 sectors. The third column relates them to the European capital sector classification. The fourth and
fifth columns show how the sectors can be obtained by aggregating the M-level industries and
commodities, respectively. The sixth column relates them to the Canadian capital sector/classification.
 In R-25 sector 1 (agriculture), Belgium and Netherlands capital stock data are missing. The5
capital/output ratio in the remaining countries, using Eurostat (1990) and Eurostat (1986), is 2.289.
Multiplication with Belgium and Netherlands outputs yields stock estimates. Addition of the known
stock of the other countries yields an estimated agriculture stock of 314457 million ECU, reported in
table 5. In R-25 sectors 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, Denmark is missing. The same procedure yields Danish
stock estimates 1154.2, 1922.8, 294.0, 760.6 and 915.7 million ECU, respectively. The total Danish
stock in these sectors is known, however, 7182. We have inflated the Danish stock estimates by a
common factor to meet the total. For R-25 sectors 23, 28 and 29 capital stock data availability is as
follows:
DK FRG F B NL I UK
R-25 sector
23  S X X X X
28 ; X X X
29  G X 9 X X
First, we disaggregate the French sectors 28 + 29, using the capital/output ratios of FRG + Italy + UK
and deflation to meet the known total. Next, we disaggregate the Danish sectors 23 + 28 + 29, using the
capital/output ratios of FRG + France + Italy + UK and a tiny inflation to meet the known total. Finally
we fill the Belgium and Netherlands gaps using the capital/output ratios of Denmark + FRG + France
12
Appendix: Data and the superfree model
The European data base, comprising Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and United Kingdom, will be presented
first . The transactions matrix and the final demand vector from Eurostat (1989)4
have been published by ten Raa and Chakraborty (1991). All output flows to the
non-market services sectors (R-44 sectors 810, 850, 890, 930) are relegated to final
demand. Capital stocks data were kindly released by Eurostat (1990). They are
easily expressed in millions ECU, using the exchange rates given in Eurostat
(1986), and reproduced in table 4. The E.C. capital accounts classification is the
so-called R-25 system (see table 3). Some data are missing altogether. For others,
only subtotals are available. Since the purpose is to construct sectoral capital/output
coefficients, we fill data gaps by assuming that capital/output ratios in the other
countries extend to where they are missing or partially known . The capital stock5
+ Italy + UK. R-25 sectors 24 + 25 + 26 are treated as a conglomerate, since our own classification does
not have this detail. Of the conglomerate, only the Belgium and Netherlands data are missing and
estimated using the capital/output ratio from the other countries. The same holds for R-25 sector 27.
 This proxy is missing for France and Italy. We fill this gap by estimating net operating surplus using6
the net operating surplus/gross value added at market price ratio of Denmark + FRG + Belgium +
Netherlands + UK and applying it to the gross value added at market prices figures of France and Italy.
 Belgium data were provided to us by Eurostat (1990a).7
 Belgium shows a great reduction of market services n.e.c. in favor of classified services compared to8
previous data. We have done the same with sectors 79 (market services n.e.c.) of the first six countries.
The recipient R-44 sectors are 57 (wholesale and retail), 65 (auxiliary transport) and 69 (credit and
insurance). (Unlike Belgium, sectors 55, 71 and 77 are ignored, as Eurostat (1986) input-output table
has blanks only in these rows and columns.) For classification consistency, the key for the redistribution
must be taken from the input-output table to be used. The only possibilities are gross value added at
market prices and actual output. We have chosen the former, which are for sectors 57, 65, 69 and 79:
238019, 24432, 116606 and 108921, using Eurostat (1989). These figures include Belgium. We do not
correct for this, since the classification of data across the sectors under consideration seems to vary
between national accounts and the consolidated European input-output table. The shares of the first three
figures are 48.78%, 5.01% and 23.90%. Applied to employment of market services n.e.c. of Denmark
+ FRG + France + Italy + Netherlands + UK (27851), this yields transfers of 13586, 1395 and 6656
(thousand of persons) to sectors 57, 65 and 69, respectively. Employment in the non-market services has
been netted out of employment in sector 26 on the basis of their value added share of 71.16%.
13
transformation from R-25 to our classification involves a few aggregations and a
few disaggregations. The aggregations are trivial summations. The disaggregations
concern the split of the R-25 sectors 13, 14, 17 and 20 into our 10 + 11 + 12, 13 +
14, 16 + 18 and 20 + 26*, respectively, where 26* is part of 26, namely R-44
sector 55. We disaggregate by capital costs or the closest available proxy, net
operating surplus . The consequent estimates of total capital stock by our6
classification of sectors is given in table 4. Unfortunately, utilization rates are not
available at sectoral levels. We have to use a macro figure and apply it to all sectors
alike. The figure used in table 4 is the E.C. manufacturing capacity utilization rate
from the Commission of the European Communities (1984, p. 17), 81.2%. Sectoral
labor employment figures are published by Eurostat (1986), at national levels . The7
employment data are aggregated into the R-44 classification by replacing the last
digit of a branch code by zero. A few transfers , which seem reasonable to us, and8
aggregation according to table 3, yield the sectoral employment data listed in table
4. The labor force figure, included in table 4, is the total labor force from Eurostat
(1985) minus the employment in the non-market services.
The Canadian data base, involving one country only, is straight-forward. The use
and make tables are directly available from Statistics Canada (1987). They relate
to business activities only. Sectoral capital stock and labor employment data were
 The stock of sector 26 (in the Canadian capital classification) is confidential and has been suppressed9
by Statistics Canada (1990a).
 For industries 1 and 2 at the M-level classification, we took the rate of industry 8 since the latter is its10
main user. For industry 3, we took the weighted average of industries 16 and 18 with weights from the
U -matrix of 1980. For industries 11 + 13 and 14 + 15, a weighted average of sectoral rates was
computed, with weights taken from the V -matrix (industry totals). For industry 12 it was assumed to be
the same as for industries 11 + 12 (i.e. plastics and rubbers). For industries 30-33 and 35-50, since the
use of their output is widespread, we took the industrial utilization rate of 83.8%.
 The capital funds of M-sectors 4 + 7, 5 and 6 are, respectively, 5496.1, 8026.8 and 150.2. The11
consequent disaggregation of the utilized stock is 48152.468 + 28267.767 + 528.955 (million dollars).
Adding M-sector 26 utilized stock to the middle term and M-sector 25 utilized stock to the last term,
yields the reported figures.
The wage funds of M-sectors 4 + 7, 5 and 6 are, respectively, 3081.4, 1150.6 and 162.2. The consequent
disaggregation of employment is 300593 = 210789 + 78703 + 11096 (thousand personhrs). Adding M-
sector 26 employment to the middle term and M-sector 25 employment to the last term, yields 210789,
111257 and 114933. Since total employment is 10,143,535 persons, working 18090468 thousand
personhours, multiplication with the ratio of the latter to the former, yields the reported labor figures.
 The capital funds of M-sectors 13 and 11 are, respectively, 121.1 and 155.4. The consequent12
disaggregation of the utilized stock is 1743.700 = 763.696 + 980.004 (million dollars). Adding M-sector
12 utilized stock to the last term, yields the reported figures.
 These figures have been taken out of services by capital fund and wage fund shares.13
 These stock figures were obtained by disaggregation, using capital fund shares.14
 Lodging and catering have been subtracted.15
14
kindly released by Statistics Canada (1990 and 1990a) . The capital utilization rates9
are from Government of Canada (1984)  and from Bank of Canada (1983) for the10
construction sector. Disaggregations by capital funds and wage funds, respectively,
yield the utilized capital and labor employment reported in table 5. The
disaggregations involve the following sectors of our classification: 2 + 3 + 4 , 1411
+ 15 (capital only) , 21 , 22 + 23 (capital only) , and 26 . We have included in12 13 14 15
table 5 the total capital stock figure computed from table 5 and the labor force
figure of Statistics Canada (1989). We have also added the exchange rate to table
5, to express the capital stocks in millions ECU. The source is IMF (1985). The
commodity input coefficients matrix is given by A = UV  (see Kop Jansen and ten-y
Raa, 1990; superscript -y denotes the composition of transposition and inversion,
two commuting operations), where U is the commodity by sector input matrix (use
table) and V is the sector by commodity output matrix (make table). The capital and
labor input coefficients row vectors are obtained in the same way by
postmultiplication of the row vector of sectoral utilized capital stocks and of the row
vector of sectoral labor employments with V .-y
max
x,x˜,x,x˜,c,c˜,c$0 e
yy(c % c˜) % e yy((c % c˜) subject to
(I & A)x % (I & A)x˜ % (I & A)x % (I & A)x˜ $ yc % e
yy
e yy
yc˜ % yc % e
yy
e yy
y˜c % z % z
c % c˜ ' ((c % c˜)
(I & A)x % (I & A)x˜ $ yc % e
yy
e yy
yc˜,
(I & A)x % (I & A)x˜ $ yc % e
yy
e yy
yc˜
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(1')
(2')
(2")
(3')
The superfree trade model is obtained by the following modification of linear
program (1-4).
for tradeable commodities:
        ~
with c determined by
for nontradeable commodities:
and for factor inputs:
  ~ ~kx + kx # K,    lx + lx # L,
          ~ ~kx
 + kx # K, lx + lx # L (4')
          ~European net output (I - A)x has been augmented with (I - A)x, the net output in
Europe using Canadian technology. Any European gross output component is
~generated by European or Canadian technologies with activity levels x  and x  ,i i
respectively. The same kind of substitutability is introduced in the consumption
section. European consumers are assumed to be indifferent between European final
consumption, y, and Canadian final consumption scaled up to the European level,
e yy
e yy
y.
16
These alternative life style vectors are multiplied by the consumption expansion
~factors, c and c, respectively. Finally, premultiplication by the unit row vector yields
the European terms in the objective function, (1'). The Canadian terms are
 ~
analogous, e y(c + c). We force them to trace the European consumption level byy
means of constraint (2").
17
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Table 1. Observed, free and superfree exports minus
imports from Europe to Canada (million ECU at observed
and endogenous prices, respectively)
Sector Observed exports Free exports Superfree exports
minus imports minus imports minus imports
———————————————————————————————————————
1 Agriculture 30 — 174 6,405 — 0 9,413 — 0
2-4 Minerals 196 — 1,394 4,178 — 65,734 6,830 — 0
5 Chemical Products 315 — 433 2,161 — 0 6,099 — 0
6 Metal Products 265 — 804 14,294 — 0 8,648 — 0
7-8 Machines 915 — 337 6,828 — 12,222 6,483 — 5,163
9 Transportation Equip. 598 — 162 11,081 — 0 10,534 — 0
10-12 Consumption Goods 316 — 799 21,964 — 0 21,557 — 0
13-15 Clothing & Footwear 270 — 125 9,864 — 22,373 4,920 — 97,040
16-18 Other Manufactures 263 — 1,718 20,776 — 0 24,491 — 0
Total 3,168 — 5,946 97,551 — 100,329 99,425 — 102,203
Table 2. Capital-labor ratios (ECU per worker)
Europe Canada
———————————————————————————————————————
Endowments 96,096 38,101
Endowments plus net imports: Observed 96,060 37,730
Free 96,404 36,802
Superfree 94,334 55,501
Note. Factor contents of observed and free trade are calculated using domestic technical coefficients.
Factor contents of superfree trade are calculated using the technical coefficients selected by the superfree
trade model.
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    Table 4. Capital and labor in Europe, 1980 Table 5. Capital and labor in Canada, 1980
    Sector Utilized gross stock Employment Sector Utilized gross stock Employment
(millions ECU) (1000 persons) (millions dollars) (persons)
1 255339 7278 1 47127 735518
2 131252 2006 2 19355 118192
3 335647 199 3 35010 62383
4 70347 1539 4 4912 64444
5 141435 1729 5 13642 87284
6 65256 2806 6 20016 305501
7 89933 3859 7 1793 98423
8 59177 2901 8 2531 141608
9 94758 2957 9 5823 195028
10 115891 2502 10 7749 204892
11 12127 370 11 2868 33323
12 3116 107 12 453 7622
13 55449 2960 13 3677 182166
14 15655 1015 14 764 27410
15 37657 1109 15 1642 62642
16 26868 1553 16 5635 177202
17 58342 1870 17 21977 245841
18 8980 504 18 1028 68201
19 90170 8265 19 5605 726220
20 333574 141616 20 20120 1713967
21 65645 3368 21 9276 433900
22 94553 5887 22 53712 499772
23 160684 1806 23 35659 210192
24 116174 978 24 91924 94176
25 253540 7045 25 25892 522077
26 246610 187388 26 33309 1003204
    Total 8159849 97512 Total 471499 8021276
    Force 10049079 104573 Force 563382 9450655
Exchange rate 1.5646 $/ECU
Total stock 360081 million ECU
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